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Abstract
This paper is an investigation focusing on activities detected by three SSH honeypots that utilise Kippo honeypot
software. The honeypots were located on the same /24 IPv4 network and configured as identically as possible.
The honeypots used the same base software and hardware configurations. The data from the honeypots were
collected during the period 17th July 2012 and 26th November 2013, a total of 497 active day periods. The
analysis in this paper focuses on the techniques used to attempt to gain access to these systems by attacking
entities. Although all three honeypots are have the same configuration settings and are located on the same
IPv4 /24 subnet work space, there is a variation between the numbers of activities recorded on each honeypots.
Automated password guessing using wordlists is one technique employed by cyber criminals in attempts to gain
access to devices on the Internet. The research suggests there is wide use of automated password tools and
wordlists in attempts to gain access to the SSH honeypots, there are also a wide range of account types being
probed.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper is an investigation focusing on activities detected by three Secure Shell (SSH) honeypots that utilise
the Kippo honeypot software. This paper is part of an ongoing investigation with initial work conducted in 2012
and 2013 (Valli, 2012; Valli, Rabadia, & Woodward, 2013). This investigation is similar to the research
conducted by Owens and Matthews, however this paper focusing on the use of wordlist being deployed to again
access to a system. All three SSH honeypots were configured identically using Ubuntu 11 Long Term Support
(LTS) server as their base operating systems. Additionally, they were located on the same IPv4 /24 subnet work
space on virtual private servers (VPS) (Valli et al., 2013). The Kippo SSH honeypots are referred to as Mopoke,
Quokka and Lair. The data examined in this paper were collected over a 497 day period from the 17th July 2012
until 26th November 2013.
The focus of this particular research is to identify evidence of automated attacks using password wordlists being
implemented to login and gain access to the three Kippo SSH honeypots. All three honeypots have the same
username and password databases that contain multiple “correct” login password combinations. These “correct”
combinations are part of the deception that is presented to the attacking entity by the Kippo SSH honeypot. The
passwords in these lists are drawn from well known “bad” password lists.

OVERVIEW OF THE SETUP OF THE KIPPO SSH HONEYPOTS
The Kippo SSH honeypot is a medium interaction honeypot, in that the honeypot imitates some functions that
are exhibited by a ‘real’ system (Hosting, 2013; Stevens & Pohl, 2004). The Kippo honeypot is designed to
effectively mimic a SSH server. The SSH protocol is designed to securely transmit data using a point to point
encryption tunnel (Ylonen & Lonvick, 2006). The protocol provides high grade encryption and is a secure
replacement for plaintext terminal programs such as telnet or rsh. Most network connected UNIX or UNIX-like
operating systems have SSH installed as a client and often included as a server (daemon).
Kippo honeypots are designed to collect data from attacker interaction with an emulated SSH. The emulated
SSH service is provided by an open-source, Python based event-driven program called Twisted
(TwistedMatrixLabs, 2013). Twisted provides the libraries that are utilised and deployed by Kippo honeypot to
imitate a valid “encrypted” SSH session to an entity. The honeypot also emulates a fake file system to present to
the user. The system also presents false system reporting and allows interaction with artefacts such as
/proc/cpuinfo or .bash_history logfile. The level of deception in the default setting is limited however this
functionality is able to be expanded and modified at will. For this experiment key elements were modified such
as /proc entries and different bash entries.
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The Kippo SSH honeypots are written in Python with a simple installation process. Source code was obtained
from the kippo.googlecode.com Wiki (Code.google.com, 2012).(Labs, 2011). The setup for these particular
systems used in the data collection was conducted as specified by the BruteForce Lab Guide (Labs, 2011). This
deviates from the original Kippo SSH documentation and uses the authbind daemon instead of twistd as the
initial connecting daemon for the service. The configuration lets authbind handle the binding of the twistd as a
non-root user to a low numbered TCP port and passes this to the twistd daemon. This configuration has been
found to be more consistent, reliable and secure during the conduct of the research project.
During the installation process a local MySQL database was configured securely to record all the interactions
with the Kippo honeypots. Figure 1, is a table from (Valli, 2012) which was sourced from the Kippo
documentation. It shows the MySQL database structure used in the Kippo honeypots to record all the interaction
data.
TABLE auth

TABLE input

id int(11) PK,

id int(11)NOT NULL PK

session char(32) NOT NULL,

session char(32) NOT NULL,

success tinyint(1) NOT NULL,

timestamp datetime NOT NULL,

username varchar(100) NOT NULL,

realm varchar(50) default NULL,

password varchar(100) NOT NULL,

success tinyint(1) default NULL,

timestamp datetime NOT NULL,

input text NOT NULL,
KEY session (session,timestamp,realm)

TABLE clients

TABLE sensors

id int(4) PK

id int(11) NOT NULL (PK)

version varchar(50) NOT NULL

ip varchar(15) NOT NULL

TABLE sessions

TABLE ttylog

id char(32) NOT NULL PK

id int(11) NOT NULL PK

starttime datetime NOT NULL,

session char(32) NOT NULL

endtime datetime default NULL,

ttylog mediumblob NOT NULL

sensor int(4) NOT NULL,
ip varchar(15) NOT NULL default '',
termsize varchar(7) default NULL,
client int(4) default NULL,
KEY starttime (starttime,sensor)

Figure 1 - MySQL database structure for Kippo honeypot
After recording to the local MySQL database, these data are then transmitted to a centralised PostgreSQL SQL
server that is running a Debian-Linux 5.1.49 operating system (Valli et al., 2013). Communication is achieved
using a Python extension that uses a PostgreSQL driver to connect to the SURFIDS system IDS logging server
(IDS, 2013). The centralised logging server utilises the SURFIDS system for storing the data from the
honeypots into an aggregated PostgreSQL database. The database has functions and tables specifically for the
Kippo honeypots data. In addition on the honeypots that run Kippo the researchers also operate Dionaea and
Glastopf which also report to the SURFIDS instance, however these data are not used in this analysis.

GAINING ACCESS
To gain access to these honeypot systems, as in a real system the correct username and password must be
entered at the emulated login screen. While general user accounts on well administered systems may have
lockout of the account for unsuccessful attempts it is not a feature that is enabled on administrative and root
accounts at any time. The reason being that simple denial of service can occur by locking administrative or root
accounts. This Achilles heel of system availability of administrative accounts or system accounts can be
exploited by the use of automated attack tools. The generic tool used for this type of activity is called
colloquially a “password cracker”.
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Passwords crackers can be deployed to identify the correct password by trying different passwords with
contemporary speeds reaching billions of passwords a second when using multi CPU (Central Processing Unit)or GPU (Graphic Processing Unit)-enabled password crackers. There is a finite number of passwords for any
given system often referred to as a key space. While finite these key spaces still can be computationally large for
example, the standard Windows LM (LAN Manager) password key space for all possible passwords is 243.
While it is relatively infeasible for a single conventional computer to “crack” these passwords in a timely
fashion, this does not hold for advanced techniques using compute clustering or GPU technology. Furthermore,
techniques such as pre-computed rainbow tables can greatly increase speed as the key space is computed once
and stored as a hash within a database table for easy reuse.
Passwords are typically stored as a cryptographic hash where the password has applied to it a cryptographic
process that protects the actual password on the file system from compromise by storing it as a hash or set
length ciphered text. A common method employed to achieve hashing is the MD5 hash format (Rivest, 1992).
Without the use of hashing and cryptography the compromise is at its most simple. When stored in plaintext
form, simply opening the file that contains the password and reading it. By applying cryptographic techniques to
the password and storing this on the file system as a “hash” it becomes a relatively implausible for an attacker to
obtain the password on a first guess (Preneel, 1999).
Breaking passwords
There are many different techniques that can be used. A brute force attack uses a systematic method of guessing
the password by enumerating through a combination of characters, symbols and numbers of the allowable
characters. Typically starting at one character and moving through the key space until all possibilities have been
attempted (Preneel, 1999).
A dictionary attack uses hashes of words that appear in a dictionary and compares them to the stored password
or feeds the hash as input to the login mechanism. This process of comparison continues until a match is found
or the process is terminated through user input or poor programming (Chakrabarti & Singhal, 2007).
Rainbow tables also use hash value to identify the correct password. Rainbow tables are databases comprised of
various character combinations that have been pre-computed and stored typically in an efficient binary structure,
allowing fast retrieval (Kim, Seo, Hong, Park, & Kim, 2014).
Password techniques that utilise plaintext wordlists can also be deployed. These are lists of possible passwords
typically stored as text strings a system could use. Depending on the application chosen the order of the words
in the list could be in sequential or non-sequential order. Also some advanced techniques will rearrange the
word into a series of patterns derived from a given word or string (i.e., a mask).
These types of attack tend to utilise social engineering techniques and deductive reasoning to pick viable
candidate passwords. As an example if the password being probed is from a provincial business who is a
football supporter that has a team called the Dunders, sponsors the team and the year is 2014. Plausible
passwords would of course be GoDunders, Dunders2014, GoDunders14 and the ever cryptic “sredund”.
Likewise within any culture there are often key phrases or vernacular that they use to identify and belong to the
group. For example in the “IT culture” there are passwords that are entirely plausible guesses take from the
vernacular e.g., “iamr00t”, “p0wned” or “hard scan”. Intelligent attackers know this and there are “customised”
wordlists available for download and use. In some cases these are provided as defaults with the security
software distribution or attack utilities used in, for example, Kali. Kippo honeypot facilitates the use of these
defaults to produce a list of acceptable passwords.

INTELLIGENCE GATHERED FROM THE THREE HONEYPOTS
During the period of coverage for this research there were a total 373,216 login attempts. The distribution of
these attempts was uneven, Mopoke recorded 277,248, Lair recorded 80,159 and Quokka 15,809 attempts,
respectively. This occurrence in of itself would bring serious question to the widespread, systematic scanning of
the Internet by cyber criminals claimed by researchers, governments and the media.
The successful login percentage per honeypot over the data collection period was; Mopoke 954 or 0.344%, Lair
201 or 0.251% and Quokka with 111 or 0.702%. While Quokka was the least attacked of the three honeypots
the success rate is the greatest, with an overall success rate of 1266 or 0.339%.
The methodology of the investigation begins with identifying the top 20 password attempts for the combined
data set. Once a list had been compiled, it was compared with a set of known wordlists. When the wordlist had
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been identified; the top 20 passwords from each of the host was compiled and compared to the identified
wordlists. If similarity were found further investigation was conducted.
Furthermore, the top 20 password attempts for each of the individual honeypots are markedly different; across
the combined data from all three honeypots there is a contradictory set of top 20 passwords attempts. The
purpose of this investigation is to find evidence of the consistent use of default password wordlists to gain
access to the systems.
The Kippo honeypots have front loaded passwords derived from numerous known bad databases that will allow
honeypot logins to interact with a fake command shell. This front-loading is a primary deceptive function of a
honeypot. By allowing a login, an attacker believes that s/he has gained access to the system as a result of poor
password practices by the system custodians. There is a caveat on use in that a system must not be too readily
comprisable otherwise the deception advantage may be lost.
Combined Top 20 password login attempts
Figure 2 shows the top 20 passwords attempts for the combined data set from all three hosts. The most used
login attempt was 123456 with 9548 attempts; closely followed password with 7169 attempts. 123123 recorded
only 910 attempts. The passwords identified in figure 2 are passwords that should appear in a wordlist.

Figure 2: Combined Top 20 password attempts
Identifying wordlists
Two collections of open-source wordlists were compiled. The first, collection was from a simple Internet search
for wordlists without a specified topic, 10 lists were found. The second collection was compiled from an opensource Linux distribution used for penetration testing, Kali. 17 wordlists were found (OffensiveSecurity, 2013).
Table 2, shows a table of the two collections and the wordlist within each collection, some lists belong to more
than one collection.
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Internet search of wordlists

References

500-worst-passwords.txt
cain.txt

(Warzone, 2011)
(Security, 2011; Warzone,
2011)
(Security, 2011)
(Warzone, 2011)
(Warzone, 2011)
(Openwall, 2014; Security,
2011; Warzone, 2011)
(Warzone, 2011)
(Security, 2011; Warzone,
2011)
(Security, 2011)
(Warzone, 2011)

conflicker.txt
elitehacker.txt
honeynet.txt
john.txt
password.lst
rockyou.txt
twitter-banner.txt
world-techmost_common_password.txt

Wordlist found on the
Kali distribution
best11.txt
best15.txt
best1050.txt
big.txt
burnett_top_500.txt
burnett_top_1021.txt
common.txt
idrac_default_pass.txt
ipmi_password.txt
phpbb.txt
rockyou.txt
twitter.txt
unix.passwords.txt

Table 1: Table of the two collections and the wordlist used
A grep bash script was used to parse each wordlist to identify which top 20 passwords the list contained. The
wordlist rockyou.txt was found on both the Internet and the Kali distribution contained all the top 20 passwords.
This occurrence indicates that the Kali Distribution and its older siblings in the Backtrack family distributions
could be the dominate tool of choice for cyber criminals.
The three hosts
To progress further the top 20 passwords from each of the honeypots was compiled and compared to the
rockyou.txt word list. The following table, Table 2 represents the top 20 password login attempts for each
honeypot with additional columns for the top 20 combined password attempts. While each of the data sets have
recorded different top 20 password attempts. It shows the top passwords attempt 123456 was the same for all
three data sets.
Mopoke
123456
7350
password
6204
1234
3481
changeme
2757
abc123
2592
12345
2414
test
2300
123
1904
qwerty
1342
p@ssw0rd
1102
test123
1056
12345678
1032
root
939
1qaz@WSX
926
password1
910
1
823
111111
726
123123
715
P4ssw0rd
713
654321
688

Lair
Quokka
123456
1637
123456
597
password
808
password
157
changeme
540
1234
125
Test
422
12345
101
1234
373
1
90
123
365
123
89
12345
314
test
84
Qwerty
293
root
80
Admin
281
abc123
70
test123
278
qwerty
68
p@ssw0rd
254
63
Passwd
243
admin
62
Root
237
p@ssw0rd
60
abc123
228
oracle
60
12345678
219
111111
54
1
204
123123
49
123456789
198
1q2w3e4r
48
admin123
191
123drag0s123
46
Letmein
179
123dragos123
45
1qaz@WSX
174
1qaz2wsx
45
Table 2: Top 20 passwords from the four data sets.

Combined
123456
9584
password
7169
1234
3979
changeme
3332
abc123
2890
12345
2829
test
2806
123
2358
qwerty
1703
P@ssw0rd
1416
test123
1369
12345678
1287
root
1256
1
1117
1qaz@WSX
1114
password1
1077
passwd
932
111111
925
123456789
914
123123
910

The top 20 attempts from Mopoke and Lair were also found in the rockyou.txt wordlist. However, 18 out 20
passwords were found for Quokka excluding, 123drag0s123 and 123dragos123. Further, investigation showed
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the attempted time recording for both passwords where between the same hour time period; 2013-03-26
08:15:13 until 2013-03-26 09:12:12. Both of the passwords used the same username list to gain assesses in
addition the attacks originated from the same IP address 94.127.XX.XX [anonymised] located in Serbia.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
All three honeypots have recorded passwords that have appeared in the rockyou.txt wordlist. The wordlist
rockyou.txt is widely available as it is an open-source list found on the Internet additional it is one of pre-loaded
wordlists found on the Kali distribution.
Quokka has two of the top 20 passwords not found in the list; 123drag0s123 and 123dragos123, with 46 and 45
counts repeatedly. Further, investigation has shown the passwords had orientated from the same IP address
94.127.XX.XX in Serbia. A reasonable extrapolation here is that Dragan and Drago are common Slavic
masculine names. Despite the two passwords not appearing in the rockyou.txt wordlist, the evidence still
suggests the uses of the wordlist to gain access to a system.
As the reminder of the top 20 passwords from the three data sets appear in this list. The two outliers could
suggest alternate forms of gaining access or simply ego on the part of the attacker or targeting systems owned by
an intended victim with the name Drago or Dragan. The research has proven extensive use of the rockyou.txt
dictionary in attacks on these particular Kippo based honeypots. The rockyou.txt dictionary is a default on Kali
and its predecessor (BackTrack). Furthermore, the Kippo honeypot gathers the SSH banners from the attacking
entities and again the banners are consistent with those that would be presented from a default Kali or
BackTrack installation. These factors would tend to indicate possible default usage of a tool as a result of using
a “guide” from the Internet or default mode use of a security tool.
This practise is referred to in derogatory cyber security vernacular as “script kiddie” activity. This mocks the
activity as somehow sub-normal or lacking intellectual engagement, but misses the point about the dangerous
nature and potential devastation this use can evince. This type activity is akin to thoughtless and criminal use of
a weapon without consideration of second- and third- order consequences of action.
In conclusion this evidence starts to suggest it maybe time we start considering the possession of these cyber
security weapons in the same way that we consider the possession of firearms, fissionable material or
biologicals. The type of use of cyber security tools as evinced by the data collected in this project would support
this consideration. Further research and analysis is required on the varying number of attacks recorded on the
three identical honeypots that are currently collecting attacker data.
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